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CRY HAVOC: ARE INCOMPETENT PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES RUINING THE DEFENSE BASE ACT? 
WILLIAM BURKE* 
ABSTRACT 
The Defense Base Act (“DBA” or “Act”) provides a no-fault, insurance-
backed workers’ compensation mechanism for compensating private security 
contractors who are injured overseas. Critics of the Act allege that it should 
be fundamentally altered or replaced because combat zone work is uninsur-
able, the Act’s compensation is insufficient, and it is less efficient than the 
alternatives. This Note argues that, on the contrary, the DBA insurance mar-
ket is functional and improving, its benefits are sufficient when viewed in 
combination with contractors’ other compensation, and it is a far more effi-
cient compensation system than is offered by tort litigation. The flaws cited by 
the DBA’s critics are more likely a result of problems that are extrinsic to the 
Act. Not least of these are the risks posed by some inexperienced, unpro-
fessional private military companies that are more dangerous for their 
employees and more likely to attempt to short-circuit the Act than are 
better-credentialed private military companies. Existing trade associations 
that carefully credential their members offer a potential solution: amend 
contracting regulations to require private security contractors to be certified 
by third parties like the International Stability Operations Association. 
This would allow the government to exclude the most dangerous actors 
from the market and send a strong standardizing signal to the industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 30, 2004, four Americans working as contract security guards 
in Iraq were escorting a small convoy of flatbed trucks for a company that 
was providing logistics services to the U.S. Army.1 The four contractors got 
lost in the city of Fallujah where local insurgents ambushed, beat, and killed 
all four, then hanged two.2 Pictures of the contractors’ desecrated bodies went 
viral, depicting “scenes reminiscent of Mogadishu circa 1993.”3 But when 
the administrator of the deceased contractors’ estates sued the contractors’ 
employer for wrongful death and fraud, the result was a protracted and 
procedurally complex court battle that did not end until 2011, with all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims dismissed.4 
When private security contractors5 are injured, they fall under the 
Defense Base Act’s workers’ compensation scheme.6 The DBA provides 
substantial benefits to injured contractors and death benefits to their survi-
vors if they are killed, but in the wake of the Fallujah incident, many critics 
of the current regulatory regime have argued that the DBA’s exclusive rem-
edy is insufficient.7 Much analysis has gone into the Act’s problems, but none 
of it has explored the economic links between the problems the DBA’s critics 
identify and the other major line of criticism aimed at private military con-
tractors (PMCs): the lack of accountability for PMC misconduct. 
This criticism reached fever pitch after an incident that occurred in 
Baghdad, Iraq, in September of 2007.8 A convoy of private security contractors 
                                                                                                                         
1 In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 581 (4th Cir. 2006). 
2 Id.; see also Steve Fainaru & Saad al-Izzi, U.S. Security Contractors Open Fire in 
Baghdad, WASH. POST (May 27, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2007/05/26/AR2007052601394.html. 
3 Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by 
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 515 (2005); see also Mark 
Calaguas, Note, Military Privatization: Efficiency or Anarchy?, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 58 (2006). 
4 Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011 WL 237840, at 
*11 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011) (confirming arbitrator’s dismissal of all claims with prejudice). 
5 “Private security contractors,” like the four killed in Fallujah, generally work as 
independent contractors for “Private Military Companies” or “PMCs.” Calaguas, supra note 3, 
at 59–60. The companies themselves are also often referred to as private security contractors 
or companies (PSCs). Id. They are sometimes also called Private Military Firms (PMFs) 
or Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). Id. For clarity, this Note will refer to 
the companies as PMCs and the individual contractors as either “contractors” or “private 
security contractors.” 
6 Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation (DLHWC), U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR (last visited Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ExplainingDBA 
.htm#1. 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
8 Kim Gamel, Iraqi Police Say Security Contractors Open Fire in Western Baghdad, 
Killing at Least 9, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Sept. 16, 2007, 11:14 PM), available at https:// 
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working for Blackwater,9 the same PMC that employed the four killed in 
the Fallujah incident, opened fire on civilians in Nisoor Square, killing 
nine and wounding at least a dozen more.10 The incident spawned a wave of 
scholarly legal writing calling for greater post hoc accountability for PMCs 
and contractors, whether through tort liability or criminal sanctions.11 For 
the most part, PMC critics’ calls for more post hoc accountability have 
been answered.12 
One of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s many blunders was the 
decision to exempt PMCs from criminal liability for their actions in Iraq.13 
Congress solved that issue via the National Defense Authorization Act of 
2007, which contains a provision subjecting PMCs to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice while working under military command.14 In addition, under 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, all private security contractors 
supporting the Department of Defense (DoD) in overseas contingency 
operations are subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction.15 Finally, the new Status 
of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq subjects PMCs 
operating there to Iraqi criminal law.16 






9 The PMC formerly known as “Blackwater” has been through a number of fundamental 
transformations since these and the many other ugly incidents involving the company were 
identified. For a discussion of how the company’s journey from “Blackwater” to “Academi” 
shows that it is possible to distinguish between good and bad PMCs, see infra Part IV. 
10 Gamel, supra note 8. 
11 See, e.g., Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Measures 
for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259 (2008); Oliver R. Jones, Im-
plausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of Private Military Firms, 24 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 239, 240 (2009); Craig S. Jordan, Who Will Guard the Guards? The 
Accountability of Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict, 35 NEW ENG. 
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309 (2009). 
12 Finer, supra note 11, at 259–65. 
13 See Kristine Huskey & Scott Sullivan, United States: Law & Policy Governing Private 
Military Contractors After 9/11, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION OF MILITARY AND SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND DOMESTIC 
NORMS 350 (Christine Bakker & Mirko Sossai eds., 2012) (discussing Coalition Provisional 
Order 17). 
14 MOLLY DUNIGAN, VICTORY FOR HIRE: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES’ IMPACT ON 
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 6–7 (Stanford Univ. Press 2011). 
15 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361–67 (West 2013). 
16 SHAWN ENGBRECHT, AMERICA’S COVERT WARRIORS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY CONTRACTORS 11–13 (Potomac Books, Inc. 2011); Huskey & Sullivan, supra 
note 13, at 351–52. 
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But despite this progress on PMC accountability, there has yet to be any 
significant action on PMC competence.17 The Department of State (DoS) has 
introduced a more rigorous credentialing process that has eliminated some 
of the most egregious problems.18 Additionally, DoD and DoS signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) in December 2007, in the aftermath of 
the Nisoor Square massacre, that provided some rules for conducting back-
ground checks on private security contractors, but contained no real com-
petency requirements.19 The only competency requirement in the MoA is 
that armed contractors must pass the Army’s basic marksmanship test.20 If 
contractors cannot clear this very low hurdle, however, the embassy’s re-
gional security officer is permitted to waive it.21 When the MoA was imple-
mented, its clear intent was not to vet or control military provider firms, 
but rather to try to keep track of what they were doing.22 
The lack of a mandatory competence-based certification for PMCs leaves 
the market open to fly-by-night companies that employ unqualified contrac-
tors who are unprepared for the pressures of combat.23 These individuals 
are more likely to get themselves hurt or killed, or to lose control and inflict 
civilian casualties. When the demand for PMC services outstripped the sup-
ply of competent providers, small, informally organized PMCs flooded into 
Iraq and Afghanistan to fill the gap.24 Unlike their experienced, professional 
predecessors, these new PMCs tended to employ the least qualified candi-
dates, who are “always the first to come unglued when the bullets start[] 
flying.”25 As one former private security contractor and PMC CEO explains, 
“when the call came for Iraq, the amateurs trampled the old guard in the stam-
pede to the trough of free taxpayer money.”26 As a result, these under-qualified 
                                                                                                                         
17 C. Douglas Goins, Jr., Gregory L. Fowler, & Taavi Annus, Regulating Contractors in 
War Zones: A Preemptive Strike on Problems in Government Contracts, 07-3 BRIEFING 
PAPERS 1, *15 (West 2007). 
18 ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 13. 
19 Memorandum of Agreement between Dep’t of Def. & Dep’t of State, available at http:// 
prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/PR%20Docs/DOS-DOD%20Memo%20of %20 
Agreement%20on%20Protection%20and%20Evacuation.pdf. 
20 Id. at 5. 
21 Id. 
22 Author’s personal experience while assigned to the headquarters staff in Baghdad and 
assisting in the process of creating the small entity tasked with implementing the MoA for DoD. 
23 See Deborah Avant, Think Again: Mercenaries, FOREIGN POLICY (July 1, 2004), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/think_again_mercenaries. 
24 John Riley & Michael Gambone, Men with Guns, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 39, 45 (2010). 
25 ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 41. Engbrecht provides a number of anecdotes describing 
this phenomenon in graphic, heart-wrenching detail, driving home again and again the point 
that inexperienced, inadequately trained contractors are the ones most likely both to get 
themselves or others killed and to commit atrocities. Id. at 100–22. 
26 Id. at 7. 
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PMCs rapidly amassed a long list of both contractor and civilian casualties.27 
Addressing the full sweep of this problem is beyond the scope of this Note. 
Instead, this Note will focus narrowly on the controversy over the DBA 
and argue that, contrary to the weight of academic argument, its problems are 
not symptoms of inherent deficiency. The Act is the best response to a diffi-
cult problem, and any struggles are more likely because its compensation 
infrastructure has been overloaded and short-circuited by the bad actors that 
have proliferated in the industry since its explosive growth began early in the 
Iraq War.28 Regardless of any new post hoc accountability measures, the 
reality of the market is that demand for private security services still well ex-
ceeds supply,29 so even the least qualified candidates and companies can find 
employment.30 Some critics of PMCs would have the government address 
this problem from the demand side, by simply reducing or even discontin-
uing its use of PMCs altogether.31 But this is too drastic: PMCs provide 
real fiscal and strategic benefits that make a ban inadvisable.32 
Instead, by requiring basic competency certification, the government can 
mitigate, and could eventually eliminate, many of the remaining problems as-
sociated with its use of PMCs. In the short term, the current market failure 
conditions would persist, but the worst consequences would be avoided by 
the ban on unqualified contractors. Prices would go up, but in the long run, 
this would exert pressure on other PMCs to reform in order to remain in or 
re-enter the market, thereby increasing the supply of qualified PMCs and con-
tractors overall. With fewer incompetent and unethical PMCs in the market, 
private security contract work would be safer, leading to a lower volume of 
DBA claims and lower DBA insurance premiums, and the PMCs remaining 
                                                                                                                         
27 Id., at 20, 41; see infra Part IV. 
28 ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 111–12 (explaining that by the end of 2004, there were 
over 100 PMCs operating in Iraq.). 
29 Avant, supra note 23 (“The market pressures, technology, and social change of a 
globalized world create multiple demands that national militaries have difficulty meeting.”). 
30 See ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 110–11 (arguing that economic pressures 
associated with recruiting and transporting replacements prevented many PMCs in Iraq 
from replacing incompetent or even dangerous contractors). 
31 See, e.g., Joshua P. Nauman, Civilians on the Battlefield: By Using U.S. Civilians in 
the War on Terror, Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?, 91 NEB. L. REV. 459, 497 (2012) 
(recommending that the U.S. cease using PMCs for combat-related tasks); see also Charles 
Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided Unilateralism As a 
Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2007) (arguing that PMCs are too 
expensive and not as effective as regular military forces). 
32 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that few countries have seriously considered 
imposing such a ban. See LINDSEY CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING WAR 676 
(2013). The only example the authors cite is a draft bill being considered by pacifist 
Switzerland. Id. 
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in the market would be more likely to fulfill their obligations under the Act, 
leading to more reliable and prompt compensation for injured contractors. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the PMC industry, the DBA 
injury compensation mechanism, and the main lines of criticism of the Act. 
Part II responds to arguments that combat zone activities are uninsurable and 
that DBA compensation is insufficient. Part III focuses on the argument that 
the DBA is an inefficient system of compensation. Part IV offers an alterna-
tive explanation for the DBA’s apparent problems. Part V concludes with a 
discussion about regulatory action that could address this problem. 
I. PMCS AND THE DBA 
PMCs provide a variety of military support services, ranging from feeding 
and supplying troops, to technical support for information and weapons sys-
tems, to armed security support.33 Despite some concern over their use,34 
PMCs have been part of the American way of war since 1775.35 Immediately 
following the end of the Cold War, however, the United States began to use 
PMCs more and more frequently; now it uses them more than ever before.36 
The end of the bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union ushered in a much more complex international security environment.37 
Non-state actors emerged as both threats and targets, as increasingly powerful 
and active drug cartel and terror networks found international non-governmen-
tal organizations and multinational corporations to be relatively soft targets.38 
At the same time, post-Cold War military demobilizations resulted in a large 
supply of trained, experienced, and professional soldiers willing and able 
to step into the security gap.39 Western governments, riding an ideological 
                                                                                                                         
33 See Goins, Fowler, & Annus, supra note 17, at *4. 
34 See infra Parts II.A and III.C. 
35 Matthew Underwood, “Jealousies of A Standing Army”: The Use of Mercenaries in 
the American Revolution and Its Implications for Congress’s Role in Regulating Private 
Military Firms, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 317, 325 (2012); see also Robert H. Patton, The Unlikely 
Role of a Patriot Pirate Navy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 27, 2008), http://www 
.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/06/27/the-unlikely-role-of-patriot-pirates (describ-
ing the Colonial reliance on privateer naval forces in the Revolutionary War). The similarity 
between Colonial privateers and modern PMCs is underscored by the fact that both Thomas 
Paine and George Washington were shareholders in proto-corporate privateering ventures. 
DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
36 Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Affairs, BROOKINGS (March/April 
2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/03/01usdepartment 
ofdefense-singer. 
37 Id. 
38 Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 47. 
39 Id. at 43–44; see also DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 2–3, 8–9 (attributing the emergence 
of the modern PMC to the post–Cold War “peace dividend”). 
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wave favoring privatization of government services quickly saw that they 
could save billions of dollars by outsourcing traditional military support 
functions to the emerging PMC industry40 and their use expanded rapidly 
throughout the 1990s.41 
The model of using these contractors as proxy forces for U.S. national 
security and foreign policy missions began in earnest in 1994 with the Clinton 
Administration’s decision to surreptitiously assist Croatia in its fight against 
Serbia by allowing Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) to deploy 
contractors to Croatia.42 MPRI was ostensibly in Croatia to lead a course 
called the “Democratic Transition Assistance Program,” aimed at enhancing 
the Croatian military’s understanding of the need to subordinate itself to civil-
ian control in the service of democracy.43 Whatever MPRI actually taught 
the Croatian Army about civil-military relations, it is evident that it also 
shared some more practical lessons as well: only nine months after DTAP’s 
inception, the Croats launched an offensive that employed American-style 
maneuver warfare doctrine, including “[c]lose coordination of armor, air-
power, and artillery,” to win back in the span of one week all of the territory 
their erstwhile incompetent army had lost to the Serbs since 1991.44 
At the same time, DoD became aware of potential savings PMCs could 
offer in logistics support.45 Partly in response to the logistics contracting 
chaos of the 1991 Gulf War, DoD awarded the first five-year comprehensive 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract (LOGCAP I) to Brown & 
Root Services in 1992,46 freeing DoD to shift more of its resources from lo-
gistics and support functions to those more directly related to war-
fighting.47 Brown & Root went on to support forward-deployed American 
                                                                                                                         
40 DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 10–11. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney commissioned 
a Defense Science Board study of privatization options in 1996 that found that an aggres-
sive shift to outsourcing could save the DoD between seven and twelve billion dollars. Id. 
A subsequent study by the Government Accountability Office found that this projection was 
overstated by as much as 30 percent, however, this still left a projected savings per annum 
of at least five billion dollars under peacetime conditions. Id. 
41 Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 44–45 (stating that the U.S. troop-to-contractor 
ratios for World War I, World War II, and Vietnam were, respectively, 24:1, 7:1, and 5:1.); 
see also Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 334–35 (stating that in Iraq and Afghan-
istan, U.S. troop-to-contactor ratios have hovered around 1:1 with occasional spikes as 
high as 1:1.29 in Iraq and 1:1.42 in Afghanistan); Avant, supra note 23 (describing that while 
PMCs are not new, their use has nevertheless markedly increased). 
42 ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 78. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 78–79. 
45 Id. at 73–75. 
46 Id. at 74–75. See also Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 45. 
47 Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 45 (quoting a senior officer in Baghdad explaining: 
“We fight the war, and they do the shit work.”). 
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forces in Somalia, Kuwait, Rwanda, and Bosnia, building a substantial record 
of successes.48 
As the distinction between MPRI and Brown & Root’s activities suggests, 
the companies that emerged in this environment were not all the same.49 
Different companies do different things, giving rise to different risks of injury 
and different legal questions regarding DBA insurance coverage.50 “Military 
Provider Firms” that provide armed operatives for defensive combat and se-
curity services51 are the most relevant type here because armed security is the 
most dangerous contract task, and these firms accordingly bear the greatest 
risk of contractor injuries and deaths. 
When regular military service members are injured, they enjoy substantial 
health and compensation benefits provided by the military services and the 
Veterans Administration,52 but they are barred from suing the government by 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.53 Private security contractors, aside from 
the DBA’s provisions, are in the opposite position, with no care or compensa-
tion, but also no bar against suit.54 Thus, with more contractors suffering more 
injuries, the government would have exponentially greater exposure to the 
costs associated with tort suits arising out of those injuries.55 Fortunately, 
                                                                                                                         
48 ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 74–75. In 1997, DynCorp, one of the other most 
prominent PMCs, won the bidding for the LOGCAP II contract which ran from 1997–2002, 
but there were no major deployments calling for LOGCAP support during that period. Id. In 
2001, Brown & Root, soon to become Kellogg, Brown & Root, or KBR, won the bid for 
LOGCAP III in large part on the strength of its demonstrated success during the much more 
active LOGCAP I period. Id. LOGCAP III’s period of performance was from 2002 to 2007. 
Id. However, with the Iraq War “surge” at its height in 2006–2007, the negotiations, bidding, 
and implementation of LOGCAP IV were somewhat delayed and KBR’s LOGCAP III 
contract was extended. Author’s personal experience while serving as a Management Analyst 
in the Multinational Force, Iraq, Resource Management directorate in Baghdad, Iraq. 
49 SINGER, supra note 36, at 2. 
50 Id. 
51 DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 12–13 (citing PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: 
THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 93–97 (2003)). Singer’s typology breaks 
PMCs down into three categories: “Military Support Firms” that provide only non-lethal 
logistics support, “Military Consultant Firms” that provide operational analysis and training 
services, and “Military Provider Firms.” Id. 
52 Hugh Barrett McClean, Defense Base Act Insurance: Allocating Wartime Contracting 
Risks Between Government and Private Industry, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635, 645 (2012). 
53 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (“[T]he Government is not liable 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of 
or are in the course of activity incident to service.”). 
54 See David Isenberg, Thinking of Suing a Private Military Contractors? There May Be 
a Way ..., TIME (Jan. 7, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/thinking-of-suing-a-pri 
vate-military-contractor-there-may-be-a-way/ (discussing sovereign immunity doctrine and 
the doctrine’s applicability to private military contractors.). 
55 See, e.g., McClean, supra note 52, at 639 (“Between January and June 2010, more 
military contractors than uniformed service members were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.”). 
296 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:287 
this problem was apparent long before the current PMC boom: in July 1941, 
in order to avoid the uncertainty and great expense associated with insuring 
against and litigating contractor tort suits, the Secretary of War asked 
Congress to create a no-fault compensation mechanism to compensate in-
jured contractors.56 Congress did so by passing the Defense Base Act,57 which 
extends the insurance-based workers’ compensation scheme of the Long-
shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) to government 
contractors injured overseas.58 
In 1958, Congress amended the DBA to extend its coverage to workers 
performing service contracts overseas but not injured while actually on a U.S. 
military base, expressly including armed private security contractors injured 
by intentional third party attacks.59 The 1958 enactment also included the 
stand-alone War Hazards Compensation Act (WHCA). The WHCA essentially 
steps in to cover those aspects of PMCs’ employment which are uninsurable 
or are only insurable at great cost, but where continued PMC participation is 
important enough to the government to warrant its special protection—for 
example, personal security details for diplomats and intelligence officers.60 
The DBA requires employers either to obtain adequate insurance for their 
contractors and employees or to obtain Department of Labor (DoL) certifi-
cation as a qualified self-insurer.61 It provides for a no-fault compensation 
system in which “the defenses of ‘fellow servant’, ‘assumption of risk’, and 
‘contributory negligence’ are not available” to an employer.62 Instead, the 
DBA extends the LHWCA’s workers’ compensation system to compensate 
contractors for any “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course 
of employment[.]”63 For the purposes of the Act, “accidental” means an 
unexpected and undesired event,64 including third parties’ intentional acts.65 
                                                                                                                         
56 O’Keeffe v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 338 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1964). 
57 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651–54 (West, 2013) [hereinafter DBA or the Act]. 
58 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901–50 (West, 2013) [hereinafter LHWCA]. 
59 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Robb, Workers’ Compensation for Defense Contractor Employees 
Accompanying the Armed Forces, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 423, 427 (Winter 2004). 
60 Id. at 429. For example, private security contractors Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, 
both of whom were killed in the September 11, 2012, attack on the United States Consulate 
in Benghazi, Libya, were part of Ambassador Chris Stevens’s personal security detail. Fran 
Townsend, Former Navy SEALs Died After Coming to the Aid of Others, CNN (Sept. 23, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/21/world/africa/libya-consulate-attack/. 
61 John Chamberlain, Insurance and Waivers Presentation at the Loyola Law School & 
U.S. Department of Labor OWCP DBA Conference (Oct. 2008), available at http://www 
.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/DBAInsuranceandWaivers.pdf. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 LHWCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(2) (West 2013). 
64 Martin v. Halliburton, 808 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989 (S.D. Tex. 2011); see also Pac. Emp’rs 
Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 61 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir. 1932). 
65 LHWCA § 902(2). 
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DBA benefits include reimbursement for medical expenses, compensation 
for disability of any extent or duration, death benefits to a deceased contrac-
tor’s surviving dependents, and vocational rehabilitation for those who are 
permanently disabled.66 Insurers and self-insuring employers have fourteen 
days from notification of an injury to begin paying benefits.67 After paying 
out benefits, the insurer may apply to DoL for indemnification under the 
WHCA if the injury was the result of a qualifying war hazard.68 
DBA compensation is an injured contractor’s exclusive remedy against 
his employer.69 The Act incorporates the LHWCA’s exclusion of all tort 
actions against the employer unless the employer has failed to comply with 
its obligations under the Act.70 Because exclusivity is central to the Act’s pur-
poses, courts are generally reluctant to set it aside, even in the face of appar-
ently inequitable behavior by an employer.71 
Criticisms of the DBA/WHCA regime generally fall into three lines of 
argument.72 The first critique contends that the insurance-based scheme is 
flawed because rapidly rising premiums have made it too expensive and 
private insurers too often deny or delay coverage to injured contractors.73 
The second critique argues that even if it were functioning properly, the 
DBA workers’ compensation schedule provides inherently insufficient com-
pensation to injured contractors.74 Finally, the third critique avers that the 
DBA and WHCA create a circular mechanism that essentially has the gov-
ernment paying premiums on insurance policies and then, when claims are 
                                                                                                                         
66 Benefits Under the Defense Base Act, DLHWC (Oct. 2008), http://www.dol.gov 
/owcp/dlhwc/BenefitsundertheDBA.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
67 McClean, supra note 52, at 652. 
68 Robb, supra note 59, at 431. 
69 Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2012). 
70 LHWCA § 905(a). 
71 See, e.g., Munns v. Clinton, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that 
employer’s and insurer’s alleged failure to pay benefits due was immaterial: the DBA barred 
the plaintiffs’ wrongful death suit because they failed to exhaust administrative processes). 
72 See, e.g., McLean, supra note 52; Jimmie I. Wise, MBA Professional Report, Out-
sourcing Wars: Comparing Risk, Benefits and Motivation of Contractors and Military Per-
sonnel in Iraq and Afghanistan (2009–2011), NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, distributed 
by Defense Technical Information Center, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&meta 
dataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA563459; Greta S. Milligan, Note, The Defense Base Act: 
An Outdated Law and Its Current Implications, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2009). 
73 McClean, supra note 52, at 649. See also House Oversight Committee Inquires Into 
DOD DBA Insurance, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR, ¶ 41 at 10 (May 2008) 
(“In 2003, contractors operating in Iraq complained to DoD about sharp increases in DBA 
insurance premiums and the inability to secure insurance at all.”). 
74 E.g., Wise, supra note 72. 
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made against these policies, also funding the pay-outs.75 Part II addresses 
the first two critiques, that insurance is an ineffective mechanism for man-
aging combat risk and that the DBA does not sufficiently compensate 
injured contractors. 
II. THE DBA INSURANCE MARKET IS FUNCTIONING AND PROVIDES 
SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION TO INJURED CONTRACTORS 
The first two critiques of the DBA are related in that they each argue that 
the Act is conceptually flawed.76 The uninsurability critique points to high 
premiums and low payout rates for DBA insurance as evidence that the gov-
ernment should not rely on private insurance markets to compensate injured 
contractors.77 While DBA insurance premiums did rapidly increase in the early 
2000s, and at the same time DBA insurance policies often included exclusions 
that prevented military provider contractors from receiving compensation, the 
most recent data show improvement.78 Insurance companies have stayed in 
the DBA insurance market and premiums are falling.79 
The insufficiency critique, on the other hand, argues that, even if function-
ing properly, the DBA/LHWCA compensation schedule is insufficient to 
make injured contractors whole, especially when compared with the much 
more generous benefits available to regular military service members through 
the Veterans Administration (VA).80 The response is a fairly simple analysis 
of the transactional decision-making underlying the critique’s comparison 
of VA benefits to DBA benefits.81 Military service members and private 
security contractors are volunteers who presumably take their benefits into 
account when choosing to enter the service or sign on to a contract.82 
A. The Uninsurability Critique 
The uninsurability critique is based on the idea that the risk of injury or 
death in a combat zone is too high for an insurance model to work, as evi-
denced by the sharp rise in DBA insurance premiums after the start of the 
                                                                                                                         
75 Milligan, supra note 72, at 427. 
76 McClean, supra note 52, at 648–49 (exemplifying the uninsurability critique); see 
generally Wise, supra note 72, at 41–44 (exemplifying the insufficiency critique). 
77 E.g., Milligan, supra note 72, at 423 (“[T]he unpredictability of risks and liabilities in the 
DBA insurance market may impede the ability of insurers to calculate accurate premiums ....”). 
78 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
79 Id. 
80 See infra Part II.B (examining the insufficiency critique). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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insurgency in Iraq.83 “[B]etween 2002 and 2008, the DBA insurance market 
grew from about $18 million to more than $400 million in government 
premiums.”84 Insurance premiums are especially high for combat-zone DoD 
contracts, which carry the greatest risk of injury or death.85 
High insurance premiums also reflect non-risk attributes of the combat 
environment.86 Distant unstable theaters of conflict present significant logis-
tical challenges for rendering care to injured contractors and for paying out 
benefits,87 especially when proving claims that “[involve] parties or witnesses 
who speak different languages, have different cultural norms, and are thou-
sands of miles apart.”88 Uncertainty is also a major non-risk driver of high 
DBA insurance rates.89 
The environment in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and the work that 
PMCs do are resistant to actuarial analysis, which depends on a sufficient 
body of reliable data for its predictions.90 Particularly at the start of the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars, insurance providers had little data on which to base 
their risk assessments and had little understanding of the circumstances under 
which they would have to pay DBA claims.91 Because many DBA insurance 
policies exclude coverage when the insured is injured in combat, from a ter-
rorist attack, while carrying a weapon, or while riding in military transport, 
there is often serious uncertainty over whether injured contractors will be 
compensated by their insurer under the DBA or directly by the government 
under the WHCA.92 
Despite these obstacles, insurance companies have stayed in the DBA 
insurance market.93 While the top four carriers do have a substantial share of 
the total number of policies, there are eighty-eight different carriers operating 
in the marketplace.94 Some PMCs have opted for self-insurance, but this is 
                                                                                                                         
83 See McClean, supra note 52, at 649; House Oversight Committee Inquires Into DOD 
DBA Insurance, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR, ¶ 41 at 10 (May 2008). 
84 McClean, supra note 52, at 649. 
85 See Goins, Fowler, & Annus, supra note 17, at 17; McClean, supra note 52, at 649. 
86 McClean, supra note 52, at 650. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 652. 
90 Id. at 650–51. 
91 See Milligan, supra note 72, at 425–26. 
92 Goins, Fowler, & Annus, supra note 17, at 17. 
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF. OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAM, DIVISION 
OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS, COMPENSATION, DEFENSE BASE ACT CASE SUM-
MARY BY CARRIER (2014), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallcarrier.htm 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (showing the insurance companies in the DBA insurance 
market through June 30, 2014). 
94 Id. 
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more likely due to their own lower than average risk exposure than to the 
absolute price of DBA insurance premiums.95 Furthermore, the most recent 
data indicate that many of the non-risk factors contributing to high DBA 
premiums have been mitigated through reforms and experience.96 
First, DoL’s Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
(DLHWC), which administers DBA compensation claims, reformed the pro-
cess by which it processes claims to handle the greater than expected volume, 
thereby reducing delays in payouts and thus insurers’ uncertainty over their 
eligibility for WHCA reimbursement.97 Second, now that the DBA/WHCA 
mechanism has been in heavy use for well over a decade, DBA insurance 
premiums, which were never the most important contributor to PMC contract 
costs, are on their way down.98 
For DoS contracts early in the Iraq war, DBA insurance premiums ranged 
from 2 to 5 percent of total contract costs.99 This figure was substantially 
higher for DoD contracts, but still only accounted for between 10 and 21 per-
cent of PMC contract costs of performance at its highest.100 However, 
these data are from the 2005 GAO report that touched off the Congressional 
controversy over the differential between DoS and DoD DBA insurance 
premiums, and represent the peak of the DBA insurance premium spike 
coming after the start of the Iraq insurgency.101 In each succeeding year, 
DBA premiums have declined and should continue to do so.102 
B. The Insufficiency Critique 
The Act’s critics further contend, however, that even if the insurance 
mechanism is operating effectively, workers’ compensation is inherently in-
sufficient compensation for the injury or death of a contractor when viewed 
in relation to the substantial benefits afforded to military service members 
and their families injured or killed in similar circumstances.103 There is no 
                                                                                                                         
95 Valerie Bailey Grasso, Baird Webel, & Scott Szymendera, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34670, THE DEFENSE BASE ACT (DBA): THE FEDERALLY MANDATED WORKERS’ COM-
PENSATION SYSTEM FOR OVERSEAS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 7–9 (2010), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34670.pdf. 
96 See generally Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95. 
97 McClean, supra note 52, at 652; OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2009 (2011), at 33, 36, available at http://www.dol.gov 
/owcp/09owcpmx.pdf. 
98 Milligan, supra note 72, at 426; Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95, at 19. 
99 Milligan, supra note 72, at 424–25. 
100 Id. 
101 Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95, at 19. 
102 Id. For example, in 2005, premiums were down 14.8 percent, and by 2006, they had 
dropped nearly 50 percent from their 2004 peak. Id. 
103 See, e.g., Joshua Schmand, Helping More Patriots for Less Money: Amending The 
Defense Base Act to Insure Defense Contractors in War Zones Under The Servicemembers’ 
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substantial evidence to support this proposition. One author, for example, 
citing three anecdotal cases among the more than 100,000 reported DBA 
claims since 2001, contends that the three contractors’ stories are sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the DBA cannot adequately compensate injured 
PMC contractors.104 
But even assuming, arguendo, that three data points among so many are 
significant, the three cases Kestian cites are examples of a functioning, if 
overburdened, system. While the injured contractor in each cited case had to 
pursue reimbursement, he received full reimbursement of medical expenses, 
back disability pay with interest, and a further ten percent award to compen-
sate him for the delay.105 In each case, the injured contractor was made whole 
through the faster, more efficient process of an administrative hearing and did 
not have to endure the likely much greater delays and expense of protracted 
litigation to receive due compensation.106 
Other authors are highly skeptical of the ability of workers’ compensa-
tion to play any part in a viable scheme.107 For example, Shailendra Kulkarni 
compares the LHWCA’s no-fault system for compensating injured non-
seaman maritime workers to the tort system under which seamen fall.108 
                                                                                                                         
Group Life Insurance Plan, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 827, 835–38 (2013); see also Shailendra U. 
Kulkarni, Comment, The Seaman Status Situation: Historical Perspectives and Modern Move-
ments in the U.S. Remedial Regime, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 121, 124 (2006) (arguing that the 
LHWCA is insufficient to compensate injured workers because their potential recoveries are 
not unlimited). 
104 Matthew R. Kestian, Comment, Civilian Contractors: Forgotten Veterans of the War on 
Terror, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 887, 900–05 (2008). Kestian’s example cases are those of Samuel 
Walker, William Manning, and “V.G.” Id. Walker was an on-base contractor employed to 
run recreation facilities for soldiers in Iraq when he was wounded by a suicide bomber. Id. 
at 901. His injuries were serious, but not life-threatening, and the crux of his case became his 
difficulty obtaining coverage for post-traumatic stress disorder treatment. Id. at 902. He had to 
complain to DoL, but was eventually compensated in full starting nineteen months after his 
injury and his employer had to pay a 10 percent penalty for not compensating him promptly. 
Id. Manning was employed in Iraq as a foreman for Iraqi laborers and was wounded by a 
mortar attack. Id. at 903. Like Walker’s employer, Manning’s did not provide him with prompt 
compensation for his injuries or reimbursement for his medical expenses. Id. Like Walker, a 
DoL administrative law judge (ALJ) eventually ordered that Manning be fully compensated 
and reimbursed and imposed a ten percent penalty on his employer. Id. at 904. Finally, V.G. 
was a contract laborer in Afghanistan who was injured when a rocket propelled grenade struck 
the tent in which he was sleeping. Id. at 904. Like the others, he received treatment and was 
evacuated to the United States, but his employer refused to pay for some care and delayed 
payment of his disability compensation. Id. at 905. As in the other cases, an ALJ eventually 
awarded him full compensation and imposed a penalty on his employer for its delay. Id. 
105 Id. at 902, 904–05. 
106 Id. 
107 E.g., Kulkarni, supra note 103, at 124–25. 
108 Id. 
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She argues that the LHWCA is insufficient because it (1) limits a worker’s 
compensation to 200 percent of the average national wage; (2) forces work-
ers to bring their claims through DoL’s administrative adjudication pro-
cess; and (3) prevents workers from bringing negligence suits against their 
employers.109 However applicable these arguments may be to maritime 
workers,110 none of Kulkarni’s complaints about the LHWCA hold water 
in the context of private security contractors. 
First, critics like Kulkarni and Kestian tend to ignore the total compensation 
arrangement that private security contractors enjoy.111 While they may not 
have as robust an injury compensation system as regular military service mem-
bers have,112 their salaries are much higher.113 In that light, the insufficiency 
critique is inconsistent with the larger PMC criticism that argues that PMC 
use is a threat to the all-volunteer military system because PMCs offer more 
attractive overall compensation packages.114 Critics like Kestian and McClean 
instead focus narrowly on the number of DBA claims that are denied—thirty 
percent to fifty percent.115 Complaints like Kulkarni’s about the cap on com-
pensation have a similarly narrow focus.116 This glass-half-empty analysis 
ignores the fact that most claims under the DBA are promptly paid in full.117 
These arguments also ignore or discount the fundamental quid pro quo 
that is the basis for this type of no-fault regime: “‘Employers relinquish[] 
their defenses to tort actions in exchange for limited and predictable liability,’ 
and ‘[e]mployees accept the limited recovery because they receive prompt 
                                                                                                                         
109 Id. 
110 See discussion infra Part III.C (regarding the zone of uncertainty between the LHWCA 
and maritime tort law). 
111 See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
112 The DBA does provide substantial benefits that are not an insignificant part of this 
total package. See infra Part III.A. 
113 See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 515 (arguing that high-paying PMC jobs are causing 
a “brain drain” in western military special forces units); DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 65 
(noting that high contractor salaries may have a deleterious effect on regular military 
morale, recruitment, and retention). 
114 Id. 
115 See Kestian, supra note 104, at 902; McClean, supra note 52, at 659 (“[I]nsurance 
carriers also paid claims in only about half the cases.”). 
116 See Kulkarni, supra 103, at 124. 
117 See infra Part III.B. (explaining that claim payment rates have been rapidly in-
creasing). Furthermore, backlogs in DBA compensation claims are not dissimilar from the 
substantial backlogs in VA disability claims. Both injured contractors and disabled veterans 
have had to wait in long lines due to the very large number of casualties suffered in the 
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. See, e.g., Josh Hicks, House Panel to Examine VA’s Progress 
With Backlog of Disability Claims, THE WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/07/14/house-panel-to-examine 
-vas-progress-with-backlog-of-disability-claims/. 
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relief without the expense, uncertainty, and delay that tort actions entail.’”118 
Kulkarni’s argument that a “lay jury” is superior to an ALJ misses the point 
of the no-fault bargain.119 By trading away workers’ right to sue in tort for 
negligence, Congress made a policy judgment to pursue the greater economic 
benefit of a more efficient system for society as a whole, rather than to sub-
ordinate the interests of all taxpayers to the narrow personal interests of a few 
individuals.120 Furthermore, a switch to a fault-based system would likely 
have the opposite effect of what commentators like Kulkarni hope. While 
some injured contractors could get more from a jury than they receive under 
the DBA, contractors like the three Kestian cites would likely have to wait 
even longer and, for the reasons detailed in Part III, run a substantial risk of 
receiving no compensation at all if left to fend for themselves in the courts.121 
III. THE DBA IS THE MOST EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE FOR 
FULFILLING ITS POLICY OBJECTIVES 
The inefficiency critique attacks the Act on practical grounds: it alleges 
that, because DoL is so actively involved in administering claims under the 
DBA/LHWCA insurance scheme, any costs saved by outsourcing to private 
insurers are undercut by duplicated efforts.122 However, this critique of the 
DBA/WHCA regime ignores the cost savings to the industry, because by not 
forcing PMCs to litigate every injury or death to one of their employees, the 
DBA prevents the substantial financial and operational costs of such litigation 
from being passed through to the government.123 Indeed, in a fault-based 
compensation system, one wonders whether the United States would be able 
to employ PMCs at all. 
This may in fact be one reason why so many commentators favor a 
tort-based system and is a major way in which the two main types of PMC 
criticisms are related.124 Some of those who see PMCs as insufficiently 
                                                                                                                         
118 Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Morrison-Knudsen 
Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 103 S.Ct. 2045, 2052 (1983)) (alter-
ations in original). 
119 See Kulkarni, supra note 103, at 124. 
120 See, e.g., Fisher, 667 F.3d 602, 610. 
121 See Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The 
purpose of the Defense Base Act is to provide uniformity and certainty in availability of com-
pensation for injured employees on military bases outside the United States.”) (emphasis added). 
122 Milligan, supra note 72, at 427. 
123 See infra Part III.A (discussing costs of litigating tort liability for security contractors’ 
injuries incurred overseas). 
124 The two main criticisms are (1) that PMCs are insufficiently accountable for their 
actions and (2) that the contractors they employ are insufficiently compensated for their in-
juries. See DUNIGAN, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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accountable for their actions see a fault-based tort regime as one way of 
holding PMCs more accountable.125 There appears to be an overall dissatis-
faction with PMCs underlying this argument, but as discussed below, 
PMCs’ practical strategic benefits outweigh any additional costs associated 
with their use.126 Thus, the inefficiency critique requires a response in two 
parts: one to address whether PMCs are an inherently inefficient alternative to 
regular military forces and examine the DBA’s contribution to that relative 
efficiency, and another to examine whether the no-fault system is the most 
efficient available mechanism for compensating injured private security 
contractors. 
A. DBA Insurance Premiums Do Not Make PMCs Too Expensive 
In some respects, the inefficiency critique is a sub-part of an overall 
cost-effectiveness argument against the use of PMCs.127 That argument 
compares the marginal short-term cost of an individual private security con-
tractor with that of a regular military service member, concluding that PMCs 
are not a cost-effective alternative to the regular military because the contrac-
tors are paid a much higher salary and require the payment of costly DBA 
insurance premiums and WHCA indemnities.128 But even if this were true, 
it has little to do with the DBA and its associated costs because they are not 
the main driver of PMC contract costs.129 Thus, to the extent that private se-
curity contractors may be marginally more expensive than regular soldiers, 
the DBA’s contribution to that expense is small and shrinking.130 
                                                                                                                         
125 E.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Should Blackwater and Halliburton Pay for the People They’ve 
Killed? Or Are Government Contractors Entitled to a Common-Law, Combatant-Activities 
Defense?, 80 TENN. L. REV. 347, 349 (2013) (“Victims of contractor misconduct have turned 
to tort law as a vehicle for receiving compensation and demanding accountability.”). 
126 Infra Part III.A (weighing the financial costs and benefits of utilizing PMCs). 
127 Tiefer, supra note 31, at 21–35. Tiefer argues that the entire LOGCAP logistics contract 
for Iraq could have been replaced with 41,000 additional support troops deployed there 
“without added wartime costs.” Id. at 28. Tiefer argues that military provider PMCs, even 
when hired to provide security for other PMCs in a combat zone, are inherently too expen-
sive and less effective than regular military forces. Id. at 30–31. Tiefer’s argument, however, 
is in the context of an overall criticism of unilateralism in favor of multilateralism. Id. at 
31. Thus, this comparison assumes, a priori, military action in the presence of large military 
coalitions that ensure regular military forces are in fact available. Of course, it was the con-
tracting chaos of a military action of this sort, the 1991 Gulf War, that led DoD to seek more 
efficient means of delivering logistic support via the LOGCAP contracts. 
128 Id. 
129 See supra Part II.A. While a fuller discussion of the cost-effectiveness and strategic 
value of PMCs is warranted, it is beyond the scope of this Note. 
130 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, even if DBA premiums remain high enough to keep mar-
ginal PMC contract costs higher than the marginal cost of using a regular sol-
dier in the short term, PMCs are still significantly cheaper in the long term: 
“[a]lthough salaries may exceed those of uniformed personnel, overhead 
pales by comparison.”131 Critiques like those leveled by Tiefer typically rely 
on short-term analyses of the form: in this mission, at this time, troops would 
be cheaper than PMC contractors.132 This analysis assumes away the massive 
overhead costs associated with military service members.133 Military service 
members are long-term employees for whom the government must pay 
food, lodging, training, medical care, and other costs regardless of whether 
the service members are actively employed.134 
PMC contractors, on the other hand, “perform discrete tasks” allowing 
the government to tailor personnel to needs and completely avoid the massive 
downtime and development costs associated with military service members.135 
The marginal cost argument also ignores the fact that in a wide range of 
specialty areas, private contractors often do a significantly better job than 
the regular military—especially those requiring “knowledge of the terrain, 
culture, and language of the region.”136 Finally, Tiefer’s analysis ignores the 
common situation in which PMC contractors are the only personnel capable 
of deploying, operating, or maintaining certain high technology systems.137 
PMCs’ ability to tailor personnel to specific tasks also improves their 
responsiveness to security demands: 
Since contractors can be hired faster than DoD can develop an internal 
capability, contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical support 
capabilities when necessary. Contractors also provide expertise in special-
ized fields that DoD may not possess, such as linguistics.... Contractors 
can be hired when a particular need arises and be let go when their ser-
vices are no longer needed.138 
                                                                                                                         
131 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 517–18. 
132 See supra note 130. 
133 See generally id. 
134 DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMPENSATION: BASIC PAY AND ALLOWANCES CHARTS 
(2014), available at http://militarypay.defense.gov/PAY/. 
135 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 518. 
136 Moshe Schwartz, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5–6 (2011), 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. 
137 See Brief for National Defense Industrial Association as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Defendants-Appellants, Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-
20202, 20371), 2010 WL 4619490 at *3 [hereinafter NDIA Amicus Brief] (citing Schwartz, 
supra note 136 at 2); Avant, supra note 23, at 21. 
138 NDIA Amicus Brief (quoting Schwartz, supra note 136, at 2). 
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In other words, even if the DBA/WHCA system makes it less cost-effective 
to use PMCs than to use regular military forces, PMCs possess unique 
attributes that make their services worth the extra cost.139 Accordingly, if 
PMCs are going to be used even if more expensive than the military, they 
will keep getting injured, so we must determine what system is best suited 
to compensate them. 
B. The No-Fault System Is More Efficient than Litigation140 
In many ways, PMC contractors injured overseas provide the ideal case 
for a no-fault injury compensation system. The DBA preempts state law tort 
claims,141 and for good reason: fact-intensive inquiries into whether an 
individual incident was accidental or not would fly in the face of the purposes 
of the Act and, in light of the distances and dangers involved, is supremely 
impractical.142 Without the Act’s exclusivity, courts would have to review in 
minute detail the interactions of parties and witnesses that took place in a 
combat zone thousands of miles away.143 If the DBA were replaced or opened 
up to penetration by personal injury and wrongful death suits in tort, the per-
verse effect for plaintiffs would actually most likely be less compensation, 
not more. 
The original impetus for the DBA bears repeating: the Secretary of War 
asked Congress to create a no-fault system of compensating injured contrac-
tors in order to save the government money.144 In Boyle v. United Technol-
ogies Corp., the Court invoked this same logic in its justification for the 
government contractor defense: “[t]he financial burden of judgments against 
                                                                                                                         
139 See DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 90. Dunigan argues that in smaller, more complex 
security and stability missions like the one MPRI undertook in Croatia, highly professional 
PMCs are more effective than the military because of their “skill, responsiveness, and 
quality.” Id. 
140 Some authors have also suggested a third alternative: bringing private security 
contractors into the military’s benefit system, allowing them to avail themselves of DoD 
health insurance, VA disability compensation, and Service Members’ Group Life Insurance 
(SGLI). Schmand, supra note 103, at 840. That alternative may be worth further explo-
ration, but state law tort suits are the chief alternative to DBA compensation actually advo-
cated and employed by injured contractors. Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 368; see 
also Kulkarni, supra note 103, at 125. Therefore, the VA/SGLI alternative will not be dealt 
with further in this Note. 
141 Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that the DBA 
provides a covered contractor’s sole remedy against his employer); see also Fisher, 667 
F.3d at 620–21 (holding that all of plaintiff’s state law tort claims against defendant PMC 
were barred by the DBA). 
142 See DBA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651–54 (West 2013). 
143 See, e.g., Fisher, 667 F.3d at 602 (discussing the DBA’s exclusivity rule). 
144 See supra Parts I & II. 
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[PMCs] would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the 
United States itself, since [they] will predictably raise their prices to cover, or 
to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered [actions].”145 
Contrary to the DBA’s critics’ assertions, a switch to tort-based liability 
would actually make using PMCs more expensive, not less.146 It could even 
undermine their use altogether: “the government will eventually end up pay-
ing for increased liability through higher contracting prices (or through an 
inability to find contractors willing to take on certain tasks).”147 There is prob-
ably too much money at stake to expect that contractors would not bid to fill 
the government’s security needs in a high-litigation environment, but high 
competency and ethics standards would probably be the first casualty to the 
cost-cutting efforts such an environment would inspire, perpetuating the very 
problems that the DBA’s critics decry.148 Tort liability, for example, would 
advantage under-capitalized (i.e. judgment-proof) companies that employ the 
cheapest contractors, regardless of their competence.149 
Even if the DBA persists, but is only softened by allowing injured con-
tractors more and wider avenues for state tort suits, the Act would be less 
efficient at meeting its twin goals of limiting employer liability and compen-
sating injured workers promptly and fairly for two reasons.150 First, the 
above-referenced barriers to fact-finding in all of these cases would seriously 
hamper plaintiffs’ ability to meet their burden of proving PMCs’ liability.151 
The very same sources of uncertainty that critics cite for not being able to in-
sure private security presents serious obstacles to fact-finding.152 Witnesses 
are less likely to be available or willing to testify than in domestic civil suits, 
the events surrounding the harm complained of occur thousands of miles from 
the forum, and both are shrouded by uncertainty born of the fog of war.153 
These obstacles can only hurt the interests of plaintiffs. 
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A landmark Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case, Feres v. United 
States,154 expresses this problem well.155 There, the Supreme Court reviewed 
appeals by three plaintiffs alleging injuries or deaths caused by the negligence 
of the United States while the victim was in active duty military service.156 
Ordinarily, these types of claims would be barred under the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity,157 but the plaintiffs contended that the government con-
sented to be sued through the FTCA.158 While the Court agreed that the 
FTCA granted jurisdiction, it concluded that the statute did not create any 
new causes of action, but merely constituted the government’s consent to be 
sued under those already existing.159 Because there was no cause of action 
already existing that would allow a soldier to recover from the government 
for his superiors’ negligence, the Court determined that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to relief.160 
The most notable part of the decision in the context of the DBA, however, 
is the Court’s policy justification for its holding.161 The Court determined that 
barring service member tort suits against the government for injuries incident 
to their service was justified by the existence of “enactments by Congress 
which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for in-
juries or death of those in armed services.”162 A no-fault compensation sys-
tem was especially important in the case of military injuries overseas because 
“[a] soldier is at peculiar disadvantage in litigation. Lack of time and money, 
the difficulty if not impossibility of procuring witnesses, are only a few of 
the factors working to his disadvantage.”163 The Feres court might just as 
well have been referring to the wisdom of the DBA’s no-fault compensation 
system in light of the challenges that private security contractors face in 
pursuing litigation. 
Second, and more importantly, there are powerful legal impediments to 
a traditional tort law compensation system for PMCs.164 Even absent the 
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Act’s exclusivity, PMCs have a variety of defenses available to them to escape 
liability for their tortious actions.165 Depending on the circumstances, suits 
may be entirely barred by the FTCA, its attendant government contractor de-
fense, or the constitutional Political Question Doctrine.166 In addition, be-
cause elite military provider firms work in an almost exclusively classified 
environment,167 if PMCs were opened up to a large number of state tort law-
suits the government would be likely to intervene and assert its state secrets 
privilege to prevent the disclosure of classified information through the civil 
discovery process. 
Though the Boyle court eventually refused to extend the Feres doctrine 
explicitly to government contractors (including PMCs), it did so in part 
because the Feres doctrine would not have provided enough protection for 
contractors.168 Instead, the Boyle court recognized a government contractor 
defense that brings contractors within the scope of the discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity when they are act-
ing pursuant to government direction.169 In 2009, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit expressly extended this defense to PMCs and held 
that their case for immunity was actually stronger than was the defendant’s 
in Boyle.170 
In that case, Saleh v. Titan Corp., a group of Iraqi citizens who were subject 
to torture in Abu Ghraib prison sued two PMCs on a variety of grounds, in-
cluding several District of Columbia Tort Causes of Action.171 Because the 
detentions under which the plaintiffs’ claims arose were “combatant activi-
ties,” the court allowed the defendant PMCs to claim immunity through the 
FTCA’s combatant activities exception.172 That clause excepts “any claim 
arising out of the combatant activities of the military or armed forces[,]” and 
the court accordingly found “an immunity net over any claim that arises out 
of combat activities.”173 Thus, “during wartime,” all claims by private security 
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contractors are preempted when their PMC employers are “integrated into 
combatant activities over which the military retain[s] command authority.”174 
Courts have also extended Boyle’s government contractor defense itself 
to PMCs where they were clearly under government direction and control.175 
In addition, PMCs operating under government supervision are also likely 
to be able to avoid liability under the political question doctrine.176 That doc-
trine bars suits as non-justiciable where the subject matter poses a signifi-
cant threat to the separation of powers.177 In the PMC context, this means 
that courts will dismiss suits that involve “judicial examination of military 
policy or military decision making.”178 
Finally, where the federal government becomes concerned that discovery 
in a state tort suit may expose classified information, it sometimes intervenes 
in the suit and moves to either bar discovery or dismiss the suit altogether 
under its state secrets privilege.179 This is especially likely in the case of 
military provider PMCs, which frequently operate alongside the military 
in highly-classified settings.180 Such circumstances are “so pervaded by 
state secrets as to be incapable of judicial resolution once the [state secrets] 
                                                                                                                         
174 Id. at 1; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2011) 
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privilege has been invoked.”181 Critically, some courts have proactively 
asserted the State Secrets Privilege on behalf of the government, obviating the 
need for its intervention.182 Thus, even if they were not barred by the DBA, 
contractors hoping to sue their PMC employers in tort would be very unlikely 
to recover in most cases. 
These obstacles to tort suits are even more imposing when compared to 
the improving certainty of an injured contractor’s recovery under the DBA.183 
Kestian cites three examples of delayed recovery for contractors under the 
DBA, but the fact that each did have to endure delays before receiving full 
compensation is more reasonably attributable to the excessive volume of 
claims than to an inherent flaw in the system.184 To the extent that there is a 
structural problem with prompt payment, it is rapidly being remedied.185 
In 2009, before DLHWC implemented aggressive reforms in response 
to Congressional pressure, only forty-three percent of DBA claims were paid 
in the first thirty days after injury.186 But in each succeeding year, the prompt 
payment rate has substantially improved so that by the end of fiscal year 2013, 
two-thirds of all DBA claims received first payment within thirty days.187 
A person who has been deprived of his livelihood or a family that has been 
deprived of a loved one is better served by such certainty and promptitude—
no tort-based system can boast of approaching it and even a partial expan-
sion of PMCs’ tort exposure would put it at risk. 
C. The LHWCA’s Problematic Border Zones Demonstrate the Risks of 
Allowing Tort Suits to Penetrate the DBA’s Exclusivity 
Congress passed the LHWCA in 1927 in an effort to protect longshore 
and harbor workers, who had previously been on the fringes of the maritime 
tort system.188 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,189 the Supreme Court held 
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that state workers’ compensation laws could not apply to longshoremen 
injured or killed while working on a vessel in navigable waters.190 Congress 
reacted by explicitly creating the LHWCA’s Federal Workers’ Compensation 
Scheme,191 moving longshore and harbor workers from the fault-based mari-
time tort system to a no-fault workers’ compensation system. Congress ap-
pears to have acknowledged and attempted to avoid the problems of a tort 
system under conditions that make extensive fact-finding difficult, expen-
sive, and uncertain.192 
However, the LHWCA’s no-fault system is complicated by interactions 
on its borders with state workers’ compensation laws and maritime tort 
law.193 The state workers’ compensation “twilight zone” has its genesis in 
the “maritime but local” exception to admiralty’s uniformity principle: 
some incidents, though properly within admiralty otherwise, are of purely 
local concern such that state law applies.194 In the context of the LHWCA, 
maritime but local means that, under certain circumstances, workers who fall 
within the “twilight zone” between the LHWCA and state workers’ com-
pensation may choose whichever no-fault remedy they prefer.195 
The LHWCA’s border with maritime torts, especially a seaman’s action 
for his employer’s negligence under the Jones Act, is more problematic.196 
Injured seamen have a general maritime law entitlement to “Maintenance & 
Cure,” a minimal workers’ compensation-like system that requires their 
vessel’s owner to provide them with medical care and bare-survival living 
expenses while they are being treated.197 To gain any sort of compensation 
for their injuries, however, seamen must resort to the courts and bring an 
action for unseaworthiness of the vessel198 or their employers’ negligence 
under the Jones Act.199 The “zone of uncertainty” between the mutually 
exclusive maritime tort and LHWCA systems arises from the fact that many 
workers perform tasks that “‘exhibit[] the characteristics of both traditional 
land and sea duties ....’”200 The result is that, in almost total frustration of the 
LHWCA’s intent to avoid the costs of litigation, many maritime workers file 
tort suits simply alleging that they are, in the alternative, harbor workers or 
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Jones Act seamen, and let the fact-finder determine in each case which 
scheme applies.201 
The DBA is presently untroubled by the LHWCA’s problematic border 
zones. Congress drafted it to avoid recreating the LHWCA’s “twilight zone” 
interaction with state workers’ compensation schemes,202 and the geograph-
ical reality that injured private security contractors’ claims under the DBA 
arise overseas adds further insulation. More importantly, the LHWCA’s 
“zone of uncertainty” over the status of maritime workers does not touch 
the DBA, which has no alternative status comparable to the maritime worker’s 
claim of seaman status.203 This is a good thing for DBA-covered contractors, 
who would face greater barriers to fact-finding204 and steeper legal barriers 
to tort suits205 than injured maritime workers. Thus, if the government keeps 
using PMCs, and they keep getting injured, the DBA is the best available 
alternative for compensating them for their injuries. 
IV. UNPROFESSIONAL PMCS EXACERBATE THE DBA’S FLAWS 
Despite its functionality, though, the DBA is far from perfect. Recent 
years have shown that it is vulnerable to delays from an overly high vol-
ume of claims and to short-circuiting by the malfeasance of unscrupulous 
employers.206 While both of these vulnerabilities doubtless have a number 
of sources, there is evidence that the less professional and formally organized 
a PMC is, the more it contributes to these problems.207 Shawn Engbrecht’s 
thesis in America’s Covert Warriors is that because military provider PMCs 
operate in a “regulatory vacuum,” the largest, most experienced, and most 
formally organized PMCs fare best in terms of both safety for their contrac-
tors and their standards of conduct: 
As a rule large companies that can eventually be held accountable to either 
a board of directors or shareholders have managed to avoid most of the 
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fallout from egregious contractor conduct. These boards and shareholders 
have provided a modicum of deterrent ... [and] been able to partially 
self-regulate .... 
 
With the exception of Blackwater, the gravest issues lay with smaller, 
amateur companies lacking experience, depth, and the prerequisite sets of 
checks and balances. They also do not have boards, shareholders, or a high 
concentration of career military.208 
Engbrecht offers an anecdote that is illustrative of this point.209 
Engbrecht’s company, the Center for Advanced Security Studies (CASS), is 
a PMC that provides a personal security training course to contractors and 
then links graduates up with military provider PMCs.210 During the Iraq War, 
CASS received an inquiry from a man Engbrecht calls “Joel”: a twenty-
three-year-old Canadian who wanted to hire a large number of CASS 
graduates.211 CASS had thirteen graduates available, but the company felt 
that only five were ready for security work in a combat environment.212 After 
further investigation, CASS discovered that Joel was only interested in the 
eight contractors it did not endorse—its representative came to the conclu-
sion that this was because “while these individuals were trained, Joel felt 
he could control them and hide his lack of experience from them.”213 Joel, 
who claimed to have served with the Canadian Special Forces, had no mili-
tary experience.214 In fact, he formed his PMC by walking into the dining 
tent of the Kuwait military base where he was employed as a tent-mender and 
asking for volunteers.215 
Despite his company’s utter lack of trained or experienced operators, 
tent-mender Joel had no trouble finding financial backing or contracts escort-
ing logistics convoys from Kuwait into Iraq.216 His company persisted in its 
practice of hiring incompetent but inexpensive contractors despite warnings 
that they were unqualified for combat.217 One such contractor, who Engbrecht 
calls “Nader,” came out of CASS’s course with a “heavy endorsement that 
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[he] not be allowed to possess firearms.”218 After a brief firefight, which 
Nader spent “cowering on the floor,” he got up and shot an innocent thirteen-
year-old girl in the head.219 Nader and his team then drove off, leaving the 
girl lying in the street.220 The representative from Joel’s company who 
related the incident lamented: “I’m stuck with an inept killer on the payroll. 
My fear is, how many others are out there that I don’t know about?”221 
Engbrecht offers several other examples of the results of the rampant lack 
of preparation and vetting of candidates by informally organized PMCs.222 
One is the story of a contractor who arrived in Iraq with a special suitcase for 
his Stetson cowboy hat, “no neutral-colored clothing in tans and browns ... 
[and] a set of really expensive fishing tackle.”223 The contractor had 
planned, at the height of the Iraq insurgency’s violence, to spend his evenings 
fishing off bridges over the Euphrates River, which runs right through Bagh-
dad’s most dangerous neighborhoods.224 “[H]e would have been killed in 
minutes[.]”225 Another describes the arrival in Baghdad of a contractor 
that the hiring PMC had worried might be “overly bloodthirsty”: 
The individual in question, a young man in his early twenties, seemed very 
agitated. It was just then that a massive car bomb detonated several miles 
away.... The new kid was white as a sheet. He never said a word but just 
turned around and got right back on the plane.226 
Unfortunately, many contractors like the one noted above did not get back 
on the plane, and the current market structure makes it difficult to exclude 
these incompetent individuals or the fly-by-night PMCs, like tent-mender 
Joel’s, that employ them.227 Demand for private security contractors in Iraq 
and Afghanistan was so high that even when a PMC dismissed an inept 
contractor, he “could always find work with a questionable firm whose oper-
ating standards matched [his.]”228 Engbrecht relates incident after incident 
in which a contractor like the ones described here “vented his fear on the 
innocent,”229 or got himself or others around him seriously hurt or killed.230 
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Professionalism is the best protection against such incidents. The more 
professional a PMC is, the better able it is to integrate with regular military 
forces, and the more it tends to respect local customs and traditions.231 These 
attributes confer multiple benefits: a good relationship with the military 
allows a PMC to benefit from the military’s intelligence, security, and logistics 
infrastructure. A good relationship with the local population allows a PMC 
to gain information critical to avoiding dangerous situations and makes its 
contractors significantly less likely to commit atrocities.232 But Engbrecht 
argues that without the internal controls in the established PMCs that expe-
rienced senior executives and board members provide, market forces exert 
too much pressure on less-established PMCs to cut corners, and they cannot 
capture these benefits.233 
Less-established PMCs are also at risk because of the difficulty of properly 
assessing the risks and requirements of private security contracts in a com-
plex operational environment. This is especially so in fixed-price contracting, 
under which the contractor bears the risk, and is therefore entitled to the 
potential benefits, of performance price volatility.234 The danger to less-
established PMCs here is that they are more likely than experienced PMCs to 
assess risks and costs poorly and accordingly underbid contracts. This leads 
to much greater pressure to employ inexpensive, but inexperienced contractors 
like Nader or to sub-contract work out to companies like tent-mender Joel’s.235 
Another way less-established PMCs sometimes cut corners is to short-
circuit the DBA. In Munns v. Clinton, for example, beneficiaries of private 
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security contractors who were abducted and killed in Iraq brought suit for, 
among other things, the failure of their decedents’ employer to pay any of 
the DBA benefits it owed to the plaintiffs.236 The court dismissed their 
claims because they had not exhausted their remedies through DoL admin-
istrative processes, and even if they had, it held that the PMC defendant 
was covered by “numerous statutory exceptions to the FTCA.”237 
In their exposition of the insurance premium critique of the DBA, Goins, 
Fowler, and Annus make the point that the requirement to hold expensive 
DBA insurance policies is at odds with the procurement policy preference for 
small businesses, as these entities are least likely to be able to afford high 
premiums.238 This argument, however, is better expressed as a critique of the 
smaller, less-established PMCs themselves: small, closely held corporations 
are generally more likely to be undercapitalized than are large, established 
corporations that strictly observe corporate formalities.239 
Indeed, Engbrecht assigns much of the blame for unprofessional PMCs’ 
behavior on their informal structures.240 For example, in discussing Blackwa-
ter’s troubles, he notes that “at the time, [Blackwater] was privately held.”241 
The story of Blackwater’s evolution demonstrates the distinction between 
formally organized, professional PMCs and informally organized, incom-
petent PMCs better than most. 
Until 2010, Blackwater was a closely held corporation, entirely owned 
and operated by its founder, Erik Prince.242 Prince sold all of his interest in 
the company to USTC, a consortium of investors that came in with the ex-
press intent of shifting the embattled PMC toward “the highest standards of 
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242 Xe Services, LLC Acquired by USTC Holdings, LLC, BUSINESSWIRE, (Dec. 17, 
2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101217005249/en/Xe-Services-LLC 
-Acquired-USTC-Holdings-LLC#.VBXtpkuUBnI. Blackwater changed its name to “Xe” 
in 2009. Jason Ukman, Ex-Blackwater Firm Gets a Name Change, Again, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 12, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington 
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governance, transparency, and performance.”243 Under Prince, Blackwater’s 
contractors engaged in violent behavior with management’s “implied en-
dorsement,”244 and were involved in more shooting incidents in Iraq from 
2005 to 2007 than larger PMCs DynCorp International and Triple Canopy 
combined.245 
Now, as Academi, the company boasts an experienced board of directors246 
of the sort that Engbrecht credits with keeping companies like MPRI and 
DynCorp International ethical.247 Whether this shift will eliminate the com-
pany’s past problems remains to be seen, but since its transition, Academi 
has not been involved in any major scandals. Perhaps most importantly, 
Academi is now a member in good standing of the International Stability 
Operations Association (ISOA), an ethics-based PMC trade association.248 
Established PMCs formed organizations like ISOA because they under-
stood that a lack of legitimacy threatened their business model.249 In order 
to address this legitimacy concern, ISOA limits its membership to PMCs 
that have appropriate ethical standards.250 ISOA’s Standards Committee 
investigates alleged misconduct by member companies, and if the violation 
is serious enough, it can expel the company from the Association.251 When 
Blackwater came under investigation for the Nisoor Square massacre in 2007, 
it withdrew from ISOA, presumably in order to avoid an ISOA Standards 
Committee investigation.252 The company did not rejoin ISOA until after 
Prince’s departure.253 
There is some empirical support for the relationship among ISOA 
membership, professionalism, and PMC safety records. DLHWC provides a 
                                                                                                                         
243 BUSINESSWIRE, supra note 242. 
244 ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 19–20. 
245 Id. at 19. 
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252 Id. 14, at 167–68. 
253 Press Release, Academi, ACADEMI Joins the International Stability Operations 
Association, ACADEMI.COM (Aug. 14, 2013), http://academi.com/news_room/press_releases/55. 
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variety of statistics regarding DBA claims on its website.254 These include 
a listing of the number of claims by employer, year, and general type of claim 
for any year since 2001 or comprehensively over the whole twelve-year span 
from September 2001 to September 2013.255 
Ideally, one could simply compare the number of claims to the number of 
contractors in theater to arrive at a ratio that would enable direct comparison 
of each PMC’s safety record. Because their complex contractual relationships 
and often classified employment make it difficult to determine the number of 
contractors a PMC had in a combat zone at any given time, however, this 
comparison is not readily available.256 But because combat is more likely 
than ordinary workplace accidents to result in deaths, a PMC’s ratio of deaths 
to total claims can provide a very rough surrogate for how dangerous it was 
for a contractor to work for that company.257 
For example, ISOA member DynCorp International, one of the military 
provider PMCs that Engbrecht frequently holds up as an example of a highly 
professional company, had death claims accounting for only 1.5 percent of 
its total, less than half the average for all PMCs.258 On the other hand, none 
of the thirty companies with the highest percentage of DBA death claims 
is a member of either ISOA or BAPSC.259 Thus, if private security contracts 
were only awarded to PMCs that are members of either BAPSC or ISOA, 
the PMCs that appear to be the most dangerous would have been excluded 
from the market, substantially reducing the volume of DBA claims. 
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companies is 57.6 percent, or nearly forty times DynCorp’s. Id. It is worth reiterating that 
this is a very rough calculation, and it is especially so for very small PMCs. For example, a 
very small PMC would have 100 percent of its DBA claims be for contractor deaths if it only 
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In aggregate, however, the disparity between DynCorp and similar PMCs’ death rates and 
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V. EXISTING CREDENTIALING STANDARDS OFFER AN EFFICIENT PRO HOC 
MECHANISM FOR ENSURING PMC COMPETENCE 
The DBA regime still requires serious improvements, but an ongoing 
dialog among the PMC industry, insurers, Congress, and the government 
agencies that use PMCs is yielding results that are rapidly addressing all of 
the critics’ procedural and structural complaints.260 Then again, existing 
regulations only tiptoe to the edge of laying down competence standards for 
PMCs without ever stepping across. For example, 32 C.F.R. Part 159 (Part 
159) requires DoD and DoS to coordinate in developing and promulgating 
minimum standards “for the regulation of the selection, accountability, train-
ing, equipping, and conduct” of PMCs in overseas contingency operations.261 
The regulation does not, however, provide any specific guidance to com-
manders and diplomats on what these standards ought to be.262 Without an 
a priori set of standardized requirements, the market cannot respond, and 
demand for professional PMCs will continue to outstrip supply. 
If DoD and DoS amend Part 159 to require PMCs to be certified,263 
they would create pressure on existing firms to either professionalize or exit 
the market.264 Using existing certification sources like ISOA would allow 
the government to capture this benefit with minimal additional resources 
or regulation.265 
If Part 159 required third-party competence certification, the effect of 
expulsion from an organization like ISOA would be a de facto debarment, but 
without the need for a costly and time-consuming government investigation.266 
                                                                                                                         
260 See, e.g., McClean, supra note 52, at 675–77 (discussing the ongoing debate and 
resulting reform efforts in detail). 
261 32 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2013). 
262 See id.. § 159.6. 
263 The Departments have the authority to do this. National Defense Authorization Act 
of 2008 § 862(a), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. Another alternative would be legislative 
or regulatory action to amend the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). See 
Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 347 (discussing the Arms Export Control Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-269, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et. seq.) and ITAR 
22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (2010)). ITAR requires military provider PMCs to obtain and maintain 
an export license for “defense services”. Id. Adding certification to ITAR’s licensing require-
ments would accomplish the same goal as amending 32 C.F.R. Part 159 in the same way. 
264 DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 166. 
265 The government already makes extensive use of third-party certifiers in government 
contracting. For example, third-party certifiers play a large role in the Economically Disad-
vantaged Woman Owned Small Business (EDWOSB) program. See 13 C.F.R. § 127.300 
(2013) (providing procedures for third-party certification of EDWOSB status). 
266 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Prob-
lem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 236 (2005) 
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When Blackwater withdrew from ISOA in 2007, it showed that ISOA’s inves-
tigations are effective enough to influence major PMC behavior.267 A man-
datory certification provision in Part 159 would bolster such investigations, 
and would have a strong standardizing effect on the industry.268 Member 
PMCs would have to submit to certifier investigation or withdraw from the or-
ganization and, in so doing, lose their ability to win contracts with the United 
States government.269 
Private security contract prices would undoubtedly go up in the absolute 
sense, as PMCs which do not meet certifier standards would be forced out of 
the market, thereby reducing available supply. However, the large external 
costs of employing such PMCs would also be avoided, not least of which 
being a reduction in casualties and non-compliance with the DBA. These ini-
tial savings would likely not be enough to overcome the supply reduction, but 
in the long run, the industry is likely to adapt.270 Because the current mem-
bers of groups like ISOA and BAPSC joined in response to existing market 
pressure for PMCs to be more responsible,271 it is not a far leap to conclude 
that non-member PMCs could quickly bring themselves into compliance 
with certification standards in the face of a demand that they do so from their 
largest potential customer.272 Thus, after a transition period, the supply of 
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competent and ethical military provider firms should actually increase, leav-
ing the DBA under a decreased burden, and allowing the government to make 
use of PMCs with a reduced fear for the safety of the individual contractors 
or the civilians with whom they interact. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Fallujah incident in 2004 and the Nisoor Square massacre in 
2006, Congress, DoD, and DoS have made strides in improving PMC ac-
countability and contract management. Nonetheless, there is still no compe-
tence-based requirement in PMC contracting that would prevent the worst 
PMCs from performing armed security functions in a combat zone.273 Be-
cause demand for private security services continues to outstrip the supply of 
competent providers, incompetent PMCs continue to win sensitive combat-
zone security contracts. Their inexperience, corner-cutting, and unethical be-
havior puts their inept contractors and the civilians with whom they interact 
at risk. Their greater casualty rates and willingness to short-circuit the DBA 
exacerbate inherent flaws in the mechanism. 
Regardless of these problems, however, the mechanism itself is worth 
keeping. After more than a decade of war in which PMCs have been exten-
sively used, insurers have sufficient data to accurately set reasonable rates. 
DoL has implemented procedures to ensure better compliance and payment 
rates are improving.274 Notwithstanding its flaws, the DBA’s no-fault system 
is vastly superior to an uncertain tort-based system for providing prompt pay-
ment to injured contractors, especially in light of the substantial legal and 
practical obstacles that tort suits would face. 
Accordingly, maintaining the DBA in its current form is the best option 
for compensating injured contractors. To relieve the pressure on the Act’s 
compensation mechanism, and to ensure the safety of the contractors it pro-
tects, as well as that of host nation civilians, the government should adopt a 
minimum competence-based certification requirement for private security 
contracts. This would bar unscrupulous and incompetent PMCs from the mar-
ket, keeping their unqualified contractors off the battlefield. 
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While this would result in greater prices in the short term, the fact that the 
industry is already moving in this direction through organizations like ISOA 
and BAPSC indicates that they are responsive to economic pressure for higher 
ethical standards. The government can boost this trend and avail itself of an 
already-established self-enforcing credentialing process by simply requiring 
certification by organizations like ISOA or BAPSC as the benchmark of 
PMC competence. Over time, these organizations’ standards would become 
the industry standard such that the supply of competent PMCs should actually 
increase, bring down total costs of their employment, and reduce the current 
difficulties faced by the DBA. 
